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Foreword 
This paper was prepared by the NASA Life Sciences Division 
at the request of the Associate Administrator for Space Science 
and Applications. The purpose is to present an analysis of man's 
capability in space. Conclusions are based on past experience in 
manned space flight, current research, and future expectations. 
The subject of automation and how humans anQ machines can be 
effectively combined in future manned missions is addressed. 
The role of man in space missions grows by the year. In the 
Space Station, he will be a critical system component. The 
success of this program requires that man's capabilities be 
employed most efficiently and productively. This paper presents 
the views of biomedical scientists as to what is now known 
concerning these capabilities and what are believed to be the key 
problem areas to be addressed if we ar~ to ensure best use of man 
in space. 
Summary 
Man's ability to live and perform useful work in space has 
been amply demonstrated throughout the history of manned space 
flight. Current planning envisions a multi-functional space 
station that would provide a base for the conduct of scientific 
experiments, manufacturing, satellite maintenance, large 
structure assembly, and the dispatch of vehicles to high Earth 
orbit and deep space missions. 
In deciding whether to allocate tasks to men or to machines, 
it is important to understand the capabilities and limitations of 
both. Man's unique abilities to respond to the unforeseen and to 
operate at a level of complexity exceeding any reasonable amount 
of previous planning distingui.sh him from present day machines. 
His limitations, however, include his inherent inability to 
survive without protection, hi.s limited strength, and his 
propensity to make mistakes when performing repetitive and 
monotonous tasks. By contrast, an automated system can do 
routine and delicate tasks, exert force smoothly and precisely, 
store and recall large amounts of data, and perform deductive 
reasoning while maintaining a relative insensitivity to the 
environment. The establishment of a permanent presence of man in 
space demands that man and mac:hines be appropriately combined in 
space-borne systems. To achieve this optimal combination, 
research is needed in such diverse fields as artifical 
intelligence, robotics, behavioral psychology, economics, and 
human factors engineering. 
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Introduction 
The successful completion of the verification phase of the 
Space Shuttle program leads inevitably to an increasing presence 
of man in space. The Space Shuttle will be used more in coming 
years for specific industrial and scientific purposes. Managers, 
scientists, engineers, and technicians will play larger roles. 
The ready availability of the Shuttle as a means for transporting 
humans and material into near-Earth space also gives impetus to 
planning for a space station. The space station is the logical 
next step - the permanent presence of man in space. 
The incorporation of man as an integral element in space 
systems requires that his capabilities be used in the most 
efficient, productive, and economical manner possible. In order 
to achieve this, considerable information must be at hand 
concerning human capabilities as they exist within the unique 
environment of space. Orderly planning by NASA for the best use 
of humans in space systems requires answers to the following 
questions. 
• What is the requirement for man in space in the 
foreseeable future? What tasks will be demanded of him 
in the space activities projected for the next decade? 
• What classes of ' human capabilities appear most relevant 
for space activities? What do we know concerning the 
proficiency, limitations, reliability, and support 
requirements for these capabilities? 
• What have we learned from past experience in manned 
space flight, particularly in Skylab and Spacelab, about 
the ability of people to live and perform useful 
functions in space? What has been the experience of the 
Soviets with their Salyut 6 and 7 space stations? 
• What are the technology drivers most likely to affect 
the way in which humans are used in space missions? How 
are these technology advances likely to change the 
astronaut/space system interface over the next decade? 
• What are the key issues to be addressed in allocating 
tasks to semi- or fully-automated machines versus human 
performance? What are the advantages and disadvantages 
in terms of cost, reliability, versatility, and decision 
making capability of automating specific tasks? How can 
computer-based systems best be used to support the human 
role? 
• What NASA flight programs and plans are designed to 
increase our knowledge of human capability in space? 
How will this information be used in developing specific 
NASA missions for the next decade? What basic research 
issues remain to be addressed, either in ground-based or 
in-flight research programs? 
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Current Programs in 
Manned Space Flight 
President Ronald Reagan, in 1982, stated four goals that 
would direct our nation's efforts in space during the coming 
decade. One of these goals was to establish a more permanent 
presence in space. This presence will be achieved through a 
number of different missions, ,each presenting the human with its 
own work requirements. The extent of the human effort in space 
over the next two decades can be appreciated through a brief 
review of the major space systems and manned missions planned for 
this period. 
Space Shuttle 
The Space Shuttle represents the key element in the American 
space program through the 1980's and into the 1990's. In the 
immediate future, nominal missions of the Space Shuttle will last 
for 7 days. There is some possibility of extending this to an 
on-oribt period of up to 30 days. Crew complement normally will 
vary between four and seven members. Inasmuch as four Shuttle 
orbiters will be in operation within a few years, the United 
States will have a relatively permanent presence in space through 
these flights alone. There also are a number of routes whereby 
the Shuttle can use its payload capability to provide for more 
extended manned missions. 
Salyut 
The Soviet Salyut program has contributed considerable 
information concerning the ability of a small number of humans to 
function for long periods of time in space. The Salyut 7, the 
latest version of a prototype space station, currently is in 
orbit. In 1982, Salyut 7 was the home for two cosmonauts for 211 
days. Recently, three crewmen, including a physician, occupied 
the Salyut 7 to begin another mission. 
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The latest Salyut has been modified significantly. It now 
has two docking ports and can be resupplied as required with crew 
consumables. Salyut 7 also uses a new onboard computer system 
which relieves the crew of much routine work and which opens the 
way for a sharing of responsibilities. The interior has been 
upgraded with numerous improvements, including use of a new color 
scheme, to achieve a more "livable" environment for longer 
missions. 
Soviet scientists since at least 1982 have been developing 
concepts for a Salyut 8 station with a mUltiple docking system 
and enhanced laboratory capabilities. The testing of the Salyut 
7, Soyuz T, and Cosmos 1443 complex is a precursor to these more 
ambitious activities in space. Though having limited capability 
for EVA, the Soviets have stepped up construction and refueling 
in space, use of inflight repair capabilities, periodic 
replacement of life support systems, and deployment of new and 
more efficient solar panels on Salyut 7. These activities 
indicate Soviet space planners are looking beyond the Salyut 
program to the development of a modular space station. 
The next Soviet station will be composed of several units, 
separately launched and assembled in orbit. One of the modules 
will be a fitted-out laboratory while others will perform purely 
technological duties. There will be observatory modules and 
facilities for manufacturing products in zero gravity. One of 
the features of this modular space station will be the use of 
technicians with new specialties and capabilities who do not go 
through the usual cosmonaut training. In fact, through an 
international cooperative program such training for non-USSR 
cosmonauts already has been implanted. 
U.S. Space Station 
A manned space station situated in low-Earth orbit is 
envisioned for the early 1990's in the American space program. 
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Initially, this station will be inhabited by a crew of less than 
ten. The station will provide a base for man to conduct a 
multiplicity of tasks includi.ng scientific experiments; materials 
processing; large structure assembly; satellite maintenance, 
upgrading, and refueling; support to high oribt and outer space 
missions, and a depot for payloads to be orbited or to be 
returned to Earth by the Shuttle. Specially trained crews will 
be required to construct space platforms, repair satellites~ 
assemble telescopes, and activate other equipment that might be 
too cumbersome or too delicate to be assembled on Earth. 
A major role of the space station's crew will be to function 
as engineers, scientists, and managers concerned primarily with 
the further development of the space station and maintaining its 
current operation. Much maintenance will be accomplished through 
EVA operations. Analyses show that the cost associated with 
conducting an EVA is minor compared to the alternative concept of 
extensive redundancy. Costs will be reduced if on-orbit 
servicing of the space station extends its life. 
American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts have conducted 
EVA's since 1965. Most of the Soviet EVA's have been performed 
on a contingency basis. HowE~ver, the u.S. EVA program has been 
more frequent, ambitious, and sophisticated (retrieval of 
scientific payloads in Apollo and Skylab, Skylab repair, lunar 
surface exploration, STS satellite repair and refueling). In the 
future, it is foreseen that EVA will become a routine operation. 
A heavy schedule of satellite servicing or space construction 
tasks might require manned EVA on an 8 hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week 
basis using rotating shifts of space crews. 
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Potential for Man in Space 
Any assessment of the purposes for which a space system 
would be constructed provides a compelling argument for the role 
for man. Man is able to handle a variety of tasks in which 
sensory inputs and motor outputs vary widely. He is able to 
store and recall large amounts of data and evaluate information 
to distinguish between that which is useful and that which is 
irrelevant. With his reasoning powers, he can evaluate a novel 
situation and make appropriate decisions concerning necessary 
actions. He can solicit additional information when necessary, 
estimate probabilities, and modify his performance as a function 
of experience. Man has a tolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and vagueness and can interpret an input signal accurately even 
when subject to distraction, high noise levels, or gaps in the 
flow of information. One of the greatest advanttages in using man 
as an element within a space system is his ability to respond to 
the unforeseen and to operate at a level of considerable 
complexity. His proficiency under circumstances of unprogrammed 
input data and complex task requirements exceeds that of any 
onboard automatic control equipment. 
Hall et al. (1982) reviewed a number of space missions under 
consideration for the future and dev~loped a listing of potential 
human tasks in scheduled as well as contingency activities. Such 
tasks include: 
o Rapid response to unforeseen emergencies 
o Self-contained operations 
o Vehicle control 
o Enhancement of instrument flexibility 
o Simplification of complex systems 
o Backup reliability 
o Equipment repair and improvisation 
o Investigation and exploration. 
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The major roles to be played by humans in space systems 
include: 
Management 
As a manager, man is capable of overseeing a large and 
complex operation and noting aspects of this operation which seem 
to be moving out of tolerance. He will follow a broadly defined 
plan without the requirement for each minute element of the plan 
having been presented to him. In short, man is capable of 
providing that invaluable quality termed "management" or 
"leadership" by which a complex and dynamic system is redirected 
as necessary to continue toward a specified goal. 
The management capabilities of man, however, can be 
influenced markedly by the quality of information he receives and 
by his general motivational state. In addition, he is 
essentially a single-channel signal detector and processor at a 
given instant. Signal detection is limited to narrow ranges, and 
input channel capacities can easily be saturated (Bejczy, 1982). 
Thus, while man can make good use of the information he receives, 
he cannot be considered an excellent inforniation receiver. 
The importance of information management in space operations 
is indicated in Table 1, which shows the rate at which 
information sources within a spacecraft have increased as the 
American space program has developed. Table 2 shows the 
corresponding growth in number of information items displayed 
both to crewmembers and ground controllers over this same time 
period. The role of a space crewman more and more is becoming 
that of a processor and manager of information. 
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Mercury 
Gemini 
Apollo 
Skylab 
Shuttle 
Space Station1 
Table 1 
Crew Displays and Controls 
Panels 
3 
7 
40 
189 
97 
200 
Work 
Stations 
2 
7 
20 
9 
40 
Control 
Display 
Elements 
143 
354 
1374 
2980 
2300 
3000 
Computers 
Number/ 
Modes 
o 
4/50 
4 
5/140 
8/200 
1Assumes real-time control onboard, data base management from the 
ground. 
Loftus, 1982 
Table 2 
Spacecraft System Information 
Total Displayed Displayed To 
Program Measurements to Crew Mission Control 
Mercury 100 53 85 
Gemini 225 75 202 
Apollo 
CM 475 280 336 
948 494 615 
LM 473 214 279 
Skylab 
CM 521 289 365 
2241 615 2034 
OAM 1720 326 1669 
Shuttle 7831 2170 3826 
Space Station1 1 0,000 4000 4000 
1 Assumes real-time control onboard, data base management from the 
ground. 
Loftus, 1982 
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Decision Making 
An important capability of man is that of being able to make 
decisions, particularly when the arrival of a decision point may 
be unexpected. Man can easily generalize and make decisions even 
though he might be faced with incomplete information. Man sets 
goals and priorities, determines risks, recognizes targets and 
opportunities, and improvises under unforeseen circumstances 
(Bejczy,1982). 
While man is entirely capable of assessing a number of 
alternatives and deciding upon a course of action, his decision 
will not necessarily be optimal in all instances. Research 
dealing with human decision making processes has shown that 
decisions are a function of several kinds of cognitive 
information (Marques and Howell, 1979): (1) prior knowledge of 
the data source, (2) intuitive "records" or memories of past and 
similar concurrences, (3) simplification rules or heuristics 
employed by the operator, and (4) the operator's systematic 
biases. Some of these processing variables can be modified 
through training; others are remarkably resistant. 
While decision making in past programs has largely been 
performed by ground support, it is expected that space station 
crews will be more self-sufficient in determining necessary 
actions and responses. The increased ability to be independent 
will result from greater use of automation and more sophisticated 
systems. Onboard capabilities will allow real-time modifications 
of planned mission overviews, accurate inventory assessments for 
determining resupply requirements, and first-hand assessments of 
the space station's "health." 
Monitoring/Inspection/Repair 
Reliability is a prime objective in the design and operation 
of any space system. The human makes a most important 
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contribution to reliability through his ability to monitor system 
operation, inspect components for which a possible malfunction is 
suspected, and make repairs as necessary. Space systems 
invariably are both complex and costly. To the extent that man 
can sense and diagnose problems, the need for mUltiple 
redundancies in the many components is reduced with corresponding 
reduction in weight, complexity, and cost. 
The value of an on-site repair capability was_noted by an 
STS-9 astronaut in a debriefing report: 
We should get ingrained in the minds of the Principal 
Investigators and others that in a manned vehicle it is 
possible for the crew to take things apart and fix them. It 
is very fortunate that the two bottons on one particular 
computer were not disabled prior to flight as had been 
planned because we were able to reprogram the device. We 
can do a lot inflight if we are given half a chance. 
The above position is reinforced by the Soviet Investigator 
Khachatur'yants (1981) who cited studies showing that the 
reliability of automatic planetary flight is considerably greater 
with a man aboard and, if the cosmonaut has the capability of 
repairing vehicle equipment and systems, flight reliability is 
greater still. Khachatur'yants concludes that, while the 
accuracy of these figures can be questioned, there is no doubt 
concerning the increase in flight reliability when there is a 
capability for human intervention in the operation of spacecraft 
systems. 
The ability of the crew to monitor, inspect, and repair 
systems in the Space Station will be critical to its success. 
Logistics will render a return-to-Earth-for-repair philosophy 
untenable. The need for in situ and workbench maintenance has 
been demonstrated during every space program so far. Vehicle 
systems will break down, crew provisions will wear out, and 
experiment equipment will fail. An onboard maintenance 
philosophy is necessary for the Space Station and must be 
considered during all program phases for successful integration. 
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The repair of the ailing "Solar Max" satellite during 
mission 41-C of the Space Transportation System (STS) was a 
graphic demonstration of human capability in the space 
environment. A similar display of the value of man in space 
systems occurred 10 years prior when Skylab astronauts Conrad and 
Kerwin were able to salvage the Skylab mission by freeing an 
obstructed solar array wing. While the nature of these repair 
efforts was different, both demonstrated the advantage of having 
"man in the loop." 
The failure of the proposed docking maneuver by astronaut 
George Nelson with the Solar Hax satellite highlights the primary 
hardware consideration for future missions. In order for routine 
satellite servicing to occur, the spacecraft must be built for 
on-orbit maintenance. This includes the use of standardized 
docking and grapple fixtures, the use of modular electronic 
subsystems, and simple access to all components with a service 
lifetime. 
In spite of the failure to achieve docking with the Solar 
Max satellite, important capabilities were demonstrated during 
the 41-C mission. These include: (1) rendezvous and inspection 
of a satellite by a free-flying, utethered crewman; (2) demon-
stration that docking is feasible with a satellite undergoing 
complex motion; (3) successful rotating grapple with the Remote 
Manipulator System (RMS);< (4) repair of mUltiple components of 
the Solar Max satellite; and (5) placement of satellite in 
payload bay work station and deployment following repair. 
Missions planned for the 1980's will demonstrate the capability 
of on-orbit refueling of satellites. Future satellite servicing 
procedures will eventually be performed in a "shirt-sleeve" 
environment, thus eliminating most of the limitations discussed 
above. At that juncture any repair that could be done on Earth 
will also be undertaken in space, including repairs to major 
structural components and replacement of defective inertial upper 
stages. 
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Furthermore, during the era of the Space Shuttle, the 
servicing and repair of satellites will probably require the 
presence of crewmembers in an EVA role. This requirement for an 
EVA capability imposes certain mission limitations pertaining to 
physiologic, human factor, and hardware considerations. 
The primary human factor and physiologic limitations of 
Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) are: (1) suits must be 
comfortable for work periods of up to 8 hours, (2) physiologic 
concentrations of oxygen and CO2 must be maintained, (3) adequate 
provisions for waste management must be integrated into suit 
design including collection of urine, feces, and emesis, (4) 
adequate caloric/fluid intake must be available, (5) suit should 
be designed as an effective work station, with proper placement 
and design of controls, lighting, and tool storage, (6) present 
design of suit gloves limits fine motor movement of the hands and 
will preclude satellite repairs requiring delicate hand move-
ments, (7) certain limitations on repetitive EVA and contingency 
EVA will be based on the need to prevent decompression sickness, 
(8) adequate training will be required to ensure effective crew 
performance, and (9) current suits do not provide adequate 
radiation shielding in case of active solar flare activity and 
would limit EVA exposure during these periods. 
Telepresence 
Telepresence refers to work activities in which a remote 
operator performs normal human functions guided by sensory 
feedback simulating actual presence at the work site. Tele-
presence will be used to perform operations which would be either 
too costly or unsafe for humans. For example, a telepresence 
system could be used to perform experiments or to service 
satellites in high altitude orbits. Telepresence allows the 
option of either ground-based operation or control from a 
satellite. Ground-based control, however, may be impractical in 
most instances because of the communication time delays in the 
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force and tactile feedback. Therefore, most planning involves 
use of a space station as a control center, with a telepresence 
system in close proximity. 
In the simplest case, a telepresence system might involve a 
dexterous manipulator arm coupled with a vision system which 
would allow an operator in a space station to perform laboratory 
work or maintenance activitiE~s at some external location. A 
free-flying telepresence system of this type might represent a 
more economical solution to satellite servicing tasks than using 
EVA with a pressure-suited hl~an. The telepresence system can 
work indefinitely, is much IE~ss subj ect to radiation hazard, and 
may in fact be more proficient than a h~an working through the 
gloves of a pressure suit. 
Telepresence is a promising concept that still requires 
considerable research and development. Much of the needed 
research will center on techniques for providing the required 
sensory feedback to the operator. 
Orbital Industry 
The recent Shuttle experiments conducted on the processing 
of pharmaceuticals provides am intriging insight into the future 
commercialization of space. In coming years, this commercializa-
tion of space may be expected to include communications, Earth 
sensing, manufacturing, nuclear waste disposal, the mining of the 
Moon and asteroids (Brodsky and Morais, 1982), as well as 
development of solar power stations and the assembly of space 
transport vehicles. Fluid physics and other types of experiments 
in materials processing also advance this prospect. A key 
feature of space industrialization will be the quest for 
materials with commercial potential which can be produced most 
efficiently in the space environment. Those with apparent pro-
mise, based on research being conducted today, include pharma-
ceuticals, infrared detector crystals, LSI circuit substrate, 
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inertial configuration fusion targets, laser optics glass, large-
particle monodisburse latexes, aligned magnets and ferromagnetic 
materials. Many manufacturing processes requiring a range of 
human skill will be necessary for successful production of these 
materials. 
A major feature of future orbital industry in all likelihood 
will be the fabrication and assembly of large structures. These 
structures will serve as solar power collectors, operating bases 
to support a variety of space missions, and platforms for use by 
communications and surveillance systems. It has been estimated 
that by the year 2020, platforms as large as 10,000 square meters 
will be needed for these purposes (Brodsky and Morais, 1982). 
While automatic manufacturing techniques can be used for much of 
the fabrication, human operators will still be required for on-
orbit management of the development and utilization of these 
structures. 
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Lessons from Manned Space Flight Experience 
The successful accomplishment of manned space missions 
extending from the first Mercury flights of 1961 to those of the 
Space Shuttle through 1983 has provided a wealth of information 
concerning man's ability to live and to perform useful functions 
in space. In general, it has been found that carefully selected 
and well-trained astronauts adjust well to life in space and show 
a number of capabilities and attributes which are of great value 
for successful mission performance. For example, Table 3 lists 
some of the capabilities and actions demonstrated by Apollo 
crewmen during the course of the lunar exploration program (von 
Puttkamer, 1982). These important and frequently unscheduled 
actions found in Apollo typify the insight and adaptiveness of 
behavior shown by space crewmen throughout the program. The 
following sections discuss some of these abilities in more 
detail. 
Mission Management 
Until humans had actually flown in space, scientists 
predicted the effects of the space environment on man's sensory 
and motor performance and on higher-order mental functioning 
would produce a number of dire consequences. Therefore, man's 
role at the beginning of the manned space flight program was that 
of a semi-passive passenger whose capability had to be 
demonstrated but who could act as a backup system if the 
automated system failed. The performance of astronauts, 
particularly during unscheduled events, removed all doubt 
concerning human adaptability to the weightlessness of space. 
Accordingly, man's role in spacecraft operations has evolved from 
that of a passenger in Mercury to that of a mission manager in 
the Space Shuttle who supervises the highly automated systems 
within the craft and manually executes critical operations. 
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Table 3 
Man's Capabilities in Space 
The Apollo Experience 
o Rapid Response to Emergencies 
e.g., Lunar Touchdown, Apollo 11 
Repairs, Apollo 13 
o Self-Contained Operation in Absence of Communication with 
Ground 
e.g., Major maneuvers behind the Moon 
o Rapid Sensing, Reaction, and Vehicle Control 
e.g., Lunar orbit rendezvous decision 
o Enhancement of Instrument Flexibility 
e.g., Inflight EVA for film retrieval 
o Reduction of Automation Complexity in Multi-Purpose Missions 
e.g., Lunar surface sampling 
o Equipment Repair and Improvisation 
e.g., Lunar Rover repair 
o Investigation and Exploration 
e.g., 33 km in 3 days, Apollo 17 (vs. 10.25 km in 10 1/2 
months, Lunokhod-1) 
von Puttkamer, 1982 
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As the role of the crewman has changed to one of being used 
as a direct system operating element, a key objective has been to 
assess his reliability and to establish means to maximize this 
reliability. In a full-scale simulation of an Apollo mission, 
reliability was assessed, using as test crews personnel who met 
criteria for astronaut selection and, in some cases, later were 
selected as astronauts (Loftus et al., 1975). For procedural 
tasks, reliability was found to vary between 0.94 and 0.98. 
Reliability was affected by training level and by provision of 
feedback concerning performance. In general, the authors 
conclude that the data substantiate the observation that 
crewmembers are very reliable with errors being detected and 
corrected promptly. They feel the error correction effectiveness 
perhaps is more noteworthy than the exceptionally low rate of 
error incidence. This self-correcting capability is one of the 
major assets of a human operating within a complex system. 
The STS-9 interaction between ground and inflight scientists 
accentuates the benefits of man as mission controller. 
Essentially, each of these crews was an extension of the other: 
the inflight crewmen as "local sensors" and interpreters of 
experiment data; and the ground crewmen a central data resource 
for directing the science or technology effort. Scientific 
return can be maximized by this synergistic effect. 
Vehicle Control 
One of the more useful skills exhibited by astronauts, as 
one might expect from highly qualified test pilots, is that of 
vehicle control. In 1966, astronauts Armstrong and Scott 
successfully accomplished the first docking of one vehicle to 
another in space when they joined the Gemini 8 capsule with the 
Agena target satellite. Manual docking of space vehicles was an 
important phase of many Ameriean and Soviet missions after that. 
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During the Apollo 11 mission, the Commander was able to 
respond rapidly to a control emergency during the touchdown 
phase. The Apollo Lunar Module was about to land in a crater 
surrounded by large boulders. To prevent a possibly disastrous 
landing, it was necessary to use the manual control capability to 
direct the craft to another and more suitable landing location. 
The manual control, while practiced extensively in simulators, 
was being done for the first time under lunar conditions and was 
accomplished flawlessly. 
The Shuttle program expanded the scope of vehicle control 
with the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and the Manned 
Maneuvering Unit (MMU). The RMS has been successfully used to 
control payload movements for surveying orbiter and space 
environments with the operator remotely located on the orbiter 
flight deck. The RMS operator also controls in "cherry-picker" 
fashion an EVA crewman to facilitate extravehicular tasks, crew 
access, etc. Inter-crew communications has been demonstrated to 
be appropriate for gross placement and fine positioning. Crew 
control of the MMU backpack has also been demonstrated on STS-41B 
in free-flight EVA. 
Orbiter vehicle control was demonstrated during STS-7 when 
the SPAS-01 payload was released from the RMS. After station 
keeping at 1,000 feet, rendezvous was accomplished and the 
payload grappled. After a second release, short-range (up to 200 
ft) station keeping was demonstrated prior to regrappling and 
berthing the SPAS. 
Maintenance and Repair 
There have been dramatic examples of the capability of space 
crewmen to effect emergency repairs during the course of both 
American and Soviet missions. The Skylab program is an excellent 
example. Without direct intervention by an astronaut, the Skylab 
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vehicle would have been uninhabitable because of the thermal 
problem caused by the loss of the micrometeoroid shield and 
failure of the solar array wing to deploy properly. In a 
difficult orbital repair job, the Skylab Commander and Scientist 
Pilot spent nearly 4 hours in EVA working to release the solar 
panel and to correct the problem to an extent that would allow 
the Skylab to be used. Their actions were instrumental in 
salvaging a $2.5 billion program. 
More recently, emergency maintenance capabilities have been 
used to advantage in the Space Shuttle missions. Following the 
STS-9 flight, one of the astronauts noted that "I can think of 
five cases where people doing the job saved the day. Among these 
were the fix of the metric camera and one of the furnaces in the 
fluid physics module." Expensive payload items were saved 
through astronaut intervention. 
Repair operations are dependent on the performance of the 
human visual and motor systems. There was initial concern over 
decrements which might be suffered by both of these systems in 
weightlessness and the length of time which might be required for 
adaptation. There was particular interest in the extent to which 
the lack of a gravity component might disrupt the skilled and 
precise movements required in vehicle control and in maintenance 
activities. 
One of the first studies of perceptual-motor performance 
during weightlessness was conducted by Gerathewohl et al. in 1957 
during vertical dives in a jet aircraft. An eye-hand 
coordination test was used in which subjects were required to aim 
at and hit the center of a test chart. During the initial trial, 
subjects showed a moderate disturbance from the decreased 
gravity. However, they made al rapid compensation and, over the 
six trials lasting for 10 seconds, performance improved until it 
was comparable to that found under normal conditions. 
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The first manned flight dispelled any real fears concerning 
the ability of an astronaut to carry out routine perceptual motor 
activities during weightlessness. Even though movement was 
rather restricted in the tight confines of the Mercury capsule, 
it was clear that no motor difficulties were encountered when 
dealing with the internal management of the spacecraft 
(Nicogossian and Parker, 1982). 
A considerable amount of quantitative data on astronaut 
performance was collected during the Skylab program. A number of 
experiments were designed to compare astronaut performance in 
various tasks under one-gravity conditions prior to flight and 
subsequently during the zero gravity of weightlessness. Among 
those tasks selected for observation were fine and gross motor 
coordination tests done with and without the use of restraints; 
tasks which required visual, tactile, or auditory feedback; and 
routine intravehicular activities such as the donning and doffing 
of the extravehicular space suit. It was found that performance 
time for most tasks increased initially after the crew's entry 
into weightlessness. However, after several days of flight, 
performance proficiency increased as crewmen adjusted to the 
weightless environment and developed techniques to optimize 
performance. By the end of the second week in space, more than 
half of the experimental tasks were performed as efficiently as 
on the last preflight trial. There was no evidence of any 
performance deterioration as time spent in weightlessness 
increased (Kubis, et al., 1977). 
Enhanced capabilities to perform extravehicular servicing 
were demonstrated during STS-41B in terms of the MMU and RMS/MFR 
(Manipulator Foot Restraint). The MMU simulated support for 
servicing the Solar Maximum Mission while the RMS/MFR supported 
an unplanned repair of a microswitch on a SPAS-01 experiment 
package. 
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The STS-9 Spacelab crew is credited with several inflight 
repair operations. A minor heating facility failed due to power 
supply problems but was restored to operation by crew action. 
Crew inflight maintenance was also performed on a Spacelab tape 
recorder. Crew brute force was used to open the airlock hatch. 
Scientific Observations 
Space crewmen have been required to make scientific 
observations in both the American and Soviet space programs since 
the very first flights. They have observed weather patterns, 
astronomical phenomena, and geologic and geographic features. 
Some of these observations involved viewing outside the 
spacecraft while others dealt with onboard scientific 
instrumentation. 
Skylab provided many examples of man's capabilities as a 
scientific observer, in some instances obtaining data that would 
not otherwise have been recorded. The Skylab crews successfully 
operated the Apollo Telescop,e Mount, made observations of the 
cornet Kohoutek and of the Earth, made tests of flammability in 
zero gravity, and conducted material processing experiments. 
Inasmuch as visual acuity is important in scientific 
observations, this physiological capacity has been examined by 
both American and Soviet scientists. In the Gemini 5 program, 
measurements were obtained with an Inflight Vision Tester, in 
which astronauts judged the orientation of rectangles in an 
illuminated area. They also searched for large patterns 
displayed at ground sites in Texas and Australia. Results of 
both the onboard and the external vision experiments indicated 
that visual performance neither degraded nor improved during the 
8-day mission. 
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In contradistinction, Soviet investigators have noted 
certain changes in visual parameters during space flight. Soviet 
investigators conclude that, during the first days of flight, the 
main visual functions deteriorate by 5 to 30 percent, followed by 
restoration of function until an approximation of preflight capa-
bility is achieved. Contrast sensitivity shows the greatest 
change, ranging from a 10 percent loss immediately after entry 
into weightlessness to a 40 percent loss after 5 days. Even so, 
Soviet investigators conclude from these experiments that the 
effect of space flight conditions on the principal visual func-
tions under normal conditions of illumination is relatively small 
(Nicogossian and Parker, 1982). Similar changes were recently 
documented on STS missions, and investigations are underway to 
establish the significance and etiology of these findings. 
More recently, there are reports by the Soviets of 
improvements in visual effectiveness during long-term space 
flight (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983). After an 
adjustment of several weeks, cosmonauts report both improved 
visual acuity and enhanced perception and differentiation of 
color, making it possible for them to identify land features and 
ocean phenomena, such as schools of fish, that were not 
calculated as being visible from low-Earth orbit. The Soviets 
are continuing studies of this type in the Salyut 7 spacecraft. 
Tests of visual function are also continuing in Space 
Shuttle missions, with studies being performed by both NASA and 
Air Force investigators. 
It is interesting to note that scientific observations have 
resulted not just from preplanned investigations and research. 
Scientific observations have also come through the serendipitous 
circumstances of a technically oriented astronaut in a 
conducive, unique, and enjoyable environment of weightlessness. 
For example, "Brand waves" (for Vance Brand on STS-S), giant 
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deep-sea waves, were "discovered" by casual viewing of Earth's 
oceans through the orbiter windows. The scientist's penchant for 
off-duty activities spent in "playing in zero-g" and gazing out 
windows undoubtedly will increase scientific return. 
Problem Areas 
While it is true that the adjustment of astronauts to space 
operations has been remarkably successful, some problems have 
been identified. For instance~, problems were encountered in the 
extravehicular tasks attempted in both the Gemini 9 and 11 
missions. The workload was found to be higher than anticipated, 
with heat and perspiration produced at a rate exceeding the 
removal capability of the life support system. Shortly after the 
Gemini 9 mission, the pilot made use of an underwater zero 
gravity simulation to test the use of various restraint systems 
and to develop better control and distribution of the workload. 
Results of the Gemini 12 EVA showed that all tasks attempted were 
feasible, using the techniques perfected in the zero-gravity 
simulation. Workload was controlled within the desired limits. 
This episode did point out the need, however, for careful study 
of pilot workload during any kind of EVA mission. 
The EVA program also showed that considerable care must be 
taken to insure that astronauts obtain satisfactory sleep. 
Improvement in sleep patterns was not achieved until the 14-day 
Gemini flight, were a flight plan was designed to allow the crew 
to sleep during hours corresponding to nighttime at Cape 
Canaveral. In addition, efforts were made to keep spacecraft 
noise to a minimum. In Skylab experiments, a detailed study was 
made of astronaut sleep. Electroencephalogram, electrooculogram, 
and head-motion signals were recorded during sleep periods. 
Results showed fewer adverse .affects than those encountered in 
Gemini. Only during the 84-day flight did one subject 
experience any real difficulty. Most changes seemed to occur 
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during sleep in the postflight pe~iod. It was concluded that 
readaptation to a one-gravity environment is more disruptive to 
sleep than the initial adaptation to zero gravity. 
In both the American and Soviet space programs, the 
psychological adjustment of crewmen to the conditions of space 
flight has been observed. In both cases, this adjustment has 
been good. In the American program, crew irritability was noted 
in conjunction with a minor inflight illness. Irritability 
produced by fatigue also has been observed when the timeline of 
scheduled activities becomes too demanding. 
The Soviets have made more detailed studies of psychological 
stresses than have their American counterparts, particularly in 
connection with their longer-term missions. Performance 
capability was evaluated against the psychological state of 
cosmonauts. The following five phases of task performance were 
observed (Space Biology and Medicine Guide, 1983): 
Familiarization Phase (Initial)--characterized by fluctuations in 
productivity and the systematic development of individually 
effective work rhythms. Errors requiring intervention by ground 
controllers are committed on occasion during this phase. 
Emotional tension accompanies the performance of critical tasks. 
In all, individuals are adapting to the unusual working and 
living conditions of space. This phase appears to last from 5 to 
7 days. 
Optimal Phase--stable and efficient performance is noted with 
appropriate psychological affect. Major physiological functions 
are adequately adapted to zero gravity. This phase lasts from 10 
to 15 dyas. 
Full Compensatory Period--significant symptoms of fatigue are 
noted which are compensated by high motivation to perform. 
Productivity and quality of work are not affected, with 
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transitory fatigue disappearing after a good night's sleep. High 
psychological and emotional tension levels are associated with 
high workload periods. 
Unstable Compensatory Perio~--increasing periods of fatigue are 
noted, with decreased work capability. There is evidence of 
emotional instability, with periodic sleep disturbance seen. 
Changes in sensory perception levels including visual, auditory, 
attention span, memory, and other mental functions are reported. 
These changes are highly individual and work capacity is affected 
only slightly, manifested by a decrease in motor reaction times, 
usually toward the end of the day. 
Final Phase--starts 2 to 3 days prior to return and is 
characterized by high emotional and work performance efficiency 
levels. 
The Soviet investigators noted that the above phases do not 
have clear-cut demarcations and are highly dependent upon: (1) 
environmental conditions of habitability such as working 
conditions, work ergonomics, and social motivation and (2) 
personal variables such as level of training and prior 
experience, general physical status, individual motivation level, 
and emotional-will power characteristics. 
In the Salyut long-term flights, cosmonauts have shown some 
psychological stress during the final days of the mission. As a 
result, during the last stages of the record 211-day Salyut 7 
mission, the cosmonaut working day was reduced from 16 to 12 
hours as a measure to boost spirits. The Soviets also have 
devised a comprehensive psyehological support program, including 
the transport of letters and news to Salyut crews and frequent 
two-way video communication with families and research 
counterparts on the ground (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1983). They feel these measures are beneficial in countering the 
long-term isolation and the heavy workload. 
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Technology Drivers 
Future space missions will use crewmen in a different manner 
and place different demands on them than was the case in Mercury, 
Gemini, and Apollo. In part, this will be because the missions 
themselves will be quite different. Another reason, however, is 
that astronauts will operate in a world with new and very 
advanced technologies. These technologies themselves will 
require a different kind of astronaut performance. The two of 
most consequence are believed to be computer systems using 
artificial intelligence concepts and semi-independent robotic 
machines. 
computers Using Artificial Intelligence 
A new generation of computers is being developed which uses 
artificial intelligence procedures. Through a procedure known as 
"knowledge engineering," thes·e computers are programmed to draw 
on the synthesized inputs of a number of human experts to achieve 
a problem-solving capability far superior to conventionally 
programmed computers. Already a first generation of systems that 
reason from rules of experience has begun to move from the 
laboratory into practical applications. By the late 1980's 
systems even further advanced. termed "deep knowledge" computers. 
could be ready for use (Kinnucan, 1984). 
A typical knowledge-based computer system solves a 
particular problem by using facts about the problems supplied by 
the user, plus its own domain knowledge, plus general problem-
solving procedures which allow it to find and apply a specific 
solution. A system may also include a natural-language interface 
for communicating with the user, a reasoning explanation 
subsystem, and a knowledge acquisition subsystem for expanding 
the current knowledge base. Later versions using "inference 
engines" will deal with symbols that represent objects. Use of 
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symbolic logic rules rather than straight numeric computation 
will add to the power, speed, and versatility of these computers. 
They will be able to operate as a right-hand assistant to an 
astronaut as he pursues his labors in a space station. Projected 
computer functions include providing information on systems 
functions, engineering design, self-diagnostics, and repair 
procedures. 
Robotics 
The remote manipulator arm used in the Space Shuttle 
represents a first-general robotics system. Such systems will 
become increasingly important in our space program. Research in 
robotics is being driven by two principal goals: (1) to relieve 
people of tasks which are boring or dangerous and (2) to expand 
human capabilities, and thus increase efficiency and 
productivity. 
Johnson et ale (1983) describes a number of mechanical 
classes of robots that may find application in the Space Station 
program. The first is the familiar robot arm used in the Space 
Shuttle manipulator system. These will find application in 
satellite repair and servici.ng, space manufacturing, and station 
laboratory tasks. Tentacle manipulators, comprised of many small 
links connected by joints each with multiple degrees of rotation, 
will have the maneuverability of an octupus arm. While such 
systems cannot deliver much force in a one-gravity environment, 
they might be of value performing relatively complex manipulative 
activities in the weightless environment of space. 
Consideration also is being given to the development of a 
standardized "Versatile Space Manufacturing Manipulator." This 
would be a general purpose manipulator outfitted to handle a 
variety of end-effectors and sensors. It could be reprogrammed 
on-site to handle a variety of tasks and would be less costly to 
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develop and space-qualify than a large number of specialized 
manipulators. 
With all robotic systems, the key research issues today 
concern the development of effective sensors, i.e. a vision 
capability, and a delicate tactile sense. These sensory 
capabilities must be incorporated if a space station robot is to 
perform anything more than relatively gross manipulative 
activities. 
Human Performance Issues in Automated Systems 
All projected aerospace systems show a trend toward 
increased complexity and automation, with a concomitant shift in 
human roles toward monitoring, situation synthesis, supervision 
and decision making. In looking toward a future space station, 
increased automation should serve to reduce mission costs, 
diminish complexity as perceived by crewmembers, increase mission 
lifetime, and amplify mission versatility. To achieve this, a 
highly automated system must amalgamate the diverse attributes of 
people, machines, and computers to yield an efficient system 
which preserves and extends unique human capabilities (Johnson et 
al., 1983). 
Increased automation - more reliance on computers and 
automatic control - has been adopted as the basis for the 
solution of many existing and anticipated problems. While there 
is no question concerning the power in automation principles, 
their use may be a mixed blessing. In some cases, the automation 
of functions can impair rather than improve human and system 
performance. A symbiotic relationship between man and machine 
must be achieved. System automation must result in an extension 
of critical human capabilities and an improvement of system 
operations. Before such a symbiosis can be achieved, however, 
there are many questions to be answered (Southwest Research 
Institute, 1982). 
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o Man/machine function allocation. Much research will be 
required to develop optimum hlman/automation function allocation 
strategies. In order to develop the most productive, safe, and 
satisfying balance between man and computer working together in a 
complex system, it is important to construct a systematic 
framework for that relationship. This relationship must be 
based, first, on previous experience with such systems, and 
second, on a careful and detailed analysis of the respective 
capabilities of man and computer and the manner in which these 
capabilities offer mutual support. 
o Decision making. Critical decisions in a semi- or 
fully-automated system will remain the prerogative of the human 
operator. In most instances, it can be anticipated that decision 
making will be distributed through the system, with the computer 
(possibly using artificial intelligence techniques) making a 
number of subdecisions and pr.:~senting these results to the human 
operator. This being the case, we do not know the optimum manner 
in which computers should derive and present information for 
final decisions. There also is a need for research concerning 
the impairment of decision making under forms of stress which 
include physiological, divided attention, and heavy workload. 
o Information presentation. Efficient ways of 
distributing and presenting both visual and auditory 
communications from multiple .sources and channels must be 
developed. With the option now of using standard typewriter 
panel data entry techniques, voice procedures, and touch panels 
for communications between the human and the computer, principles 
must be developed to insure optimum choice. 
o User confidence. The acceptance of automation of some 
or all system activities has proven to be a major problem in some 
manned systems. For instance, it has been quite difficult to 
introduce fully automated landing systems in commercial aviation 
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even though the efficiency and reliability of these systems have 
been amply demonstrated. With automated systems, the main 
problem appears to be one of under-confidence, but over-
confidence also can have severe consequences. Procedures must be 
developed to insure an appropriate confidence in system 
automation. 
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NASA Programs to Develop 
"Man in Space" Capabilities 
Through observations and experiments conducted in all U.S. 
programs to date, a wealth of information has been accumulated 
concerning the capability of humans to live and to perform useful 
functions in space. The systematic investigations made during 
both the Gemini and Skylab programs were particularly productive. 
For the most part, however, these studies provided information 
concerning adaptation characteristics and performance 
capabilities related to the specific development and exploration 
objectives of these missions. Space activities a decade from now 
will be quite different as NASA enters a period characterized by 
more routine scientific and commercial programs. There is still 
a great deal to be learned concerning human capabilities to 
operate in this type of space activity with the advanced 
technologies that will be employed. 
NASA is pursuing a vigorous program to develop a human 
factors technology to support manned space missions such as a 
space station. Notable efforts underway at this time include: 
1 • Human Behavior and Perfol~mance 
The Life Sciences Division of Headquarters in supporting 
research, through the Ames Research Center, studying the 
determinants of high levels of human performance in unfamiliar 
and stressful environments. One investigation examined data for 
the long-term effects of isolation on a small group in a 
simulated Shuttle environment '. During small-group isolation over 
a period of 105 days, subjects exhibited progressively increased 
levels of depression and impaired psychomotor performance. 
Nutritional and hormonal changes also were observed. These 
changes are being related to the specific conditions of 
isolation. 
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Other studies were conducted to analyze the effect of crew 
size and composition on hormones such as testosterone in the 
body. Hormonal levels changed when new members joined or 
departed from an established small group which produced changes 
in social relationships. Relationships that disrupted work 
routines and sleep schedules were most predictive of alterations 
in hormonal levels. 
The effects of psychological variables such as leader 
selection on performance and adjustment in the space environment 
also have been studied. The attempt in this series of 
investigations is to isolate behavioral factors and develop 
objective measures to show the importance of variables such as 
motivational state, situational determinants, sex differences, 
the influence of mentors, and job and personal satisfaction. 
2. The Human Role In Space 
This is a study supported by the Marshall Space Flight 
Center to develop an optimum strategy for assigning functions to 
man and to semi- or fully-automated systems for future space 
missions. One objective is to use a set of representative space 
missions as a basis for defining anticipated activities and then 
to list those unique and desirable human capabilities that will 
match specific mission activity requirements. The program also 
is developing objective criteria to deal with system 
effectiveness, reliability, development timelines, and cost. It 
is evaluating use of advanced technologies such as artificial 
intelligence and fully programmable robotics. 
3. Human Performance Issues Risjng From Manned Space Station 
Missions 
This is a program just being started by the Life Sciences 
Division. The purpose is to assess requirements for 
habitability, health maintenance and medical care, and to develop 
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a taxonomy of human capabilities appropriate to support manned 
missions a decade hence. 
4. Psychological Well-Being 
The Life Sciences Division is supporting habitability 
research to develop ways to ensure the psychological well-being 
of space crews under the anticipated conditions of long 
rotational periods in a space station mission. Psychological 
well-being is virtually synonymous with motivation and can be a 
key determinant of human effectiveness. Living conditions in a' 
space station will playa key role. At this time, it is 
anticipated that the volume available for a crewman's private use 
might be something less than 200 cubic feet, i.e., a volume 
smaller than 5 x 5 x 8'. Under conditions this crowded, it will 
be a challenge to provide living quarters that are pleasant and 
restful and that promote optimum crewman performance. 
5. Sensory and Motor Performance 
The Life Sciences Division is supporting work to develop 
data acquisition systems for real-time anthropometric 
measurements on moving subjeets in order to support models 
showing how people work in a space situation. Efforts also are 
being started to deveiop methods for extracting cognitive and 
sensory information from operational tasks rather than through 
laboratory experimentation. Non-intrusive measures of 
operational performance should be most fruitful in developing 
procedures to describe the hl.nnan operator and his response to 
variations in the work environment. 
6. Residence in Self-Contained Environments 
Since the psychological/psychiatric data base on space 
travelers is small, it is difficult to predict the problems that 
crewmembers might encounter during future missions with longer 
periods of unprogrammed time and social isolation. In addition, 
the composition of future crews is expected to be more diverse 
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and to contain individuals who have not been as extensively 
screened as the pilot/astronauts of past missions. For these 
reasons, the Life Sciences Division is reviewing the scientific 
data that have been collected for confined environments such as 
the Antarctic, submarines, off-shore drilling rigs, and surface 
ships. A task force of technical experts, coordinated through 
the Operational and Emergency Medicine Division of the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences, will review the 
technical literature and document their own anecdotal 
experiences. With their first-hand knowledge of these unique 
confined environments, the task force members can compare the 
similarities and differences of these environments with long-term 
space flight. In addition to studying the effect of isolation on 
individual behavior and changes in intersocial relationships, the 
task force will investigate certain psychologic and toxicologic 
consequences of long-term exposure to a crowded self-contained 
environment. 
7. Payloads and Requirements 
The Kennedy Space Center, supported by the Headquarters Life 
Sciences Division, is continuously updating information 
concerning human requirements for life support, medical care, 
habitability, workload management, and health maintenance as 
these issues impact the design of the Space Station as well as 
that of potential life sciences payloads. 
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Research Requirements for 
Long Duration Manned Space Flight 
The successful pursuit of "a permanent presence of man in 
space" requires an indepth understanding of the performance 
capabilities of space crewmen and the support needed to maintain 
best performance. The human must be studied to identify his 
characteristics, capabilities, and tolerance limits, and planned 
space systems designed with optimized interfaces. Although much 
already is known about the human and man/systems integration, 
much remains to be learned. The opportunities to discover and 
apply this knowledge in future space programs await us. 
From the results of space missions to date and from 
supporting studies, it can b'e concluded that there are a number 
of broad categories of research to be addressed. The combination 
of diverse crew complements, longer periods of orbital residence, 
employment of new technologies, and demanding industrial and 
scientific tasks makes the resolution of these research issues of 
considerable importance if humans are to perform at peak 
effectiveness. 
Architecture 
A necessary first step is to develop principles and 
standards of the construction of a spacecraft or space station so 
that it accounts for the needs and characteristics of its 
occupants. The research must deal with a diversity of 
architectural topics including development of design principles 
to meet privacy and territoriality needs, use of restraint 
systems for different classes of work, anthropometric 
considerations for different crewmembers, tolerance for 
distractions such as noise and vibration, location and use of 
exercise facilities, and development of acceptable hygiene and 
waste management facilities. 
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Man/Machine Function Allocation 
The technology for automation of many space tasks now is 
available. Microprocessor technology, new display systems, 
programmable robotics, and the advent of artificial intelligence 
systems lead to an entirely new working environment, but one in 
which a human will continue to playa critical role. However, lt 
is imperative that the human be blended into this work 
environment so that best use is made of his capabilities. There 
currently is no widely applied methodology for allocating 
functions between automated systems and humans. During the early 
stages of design, informed decisions must be made about the 
allocation of functions between humans and automated systems and 
for the combination of both in order to maximize mission success, 
efficiency, safety, and economics (von Tiesenhausen, 1982). 
Man/Systems Integration 
There must be a proper match among the human components, the 
equipment components, and the operating environment in any space 
system. It is most important that procedures be developed to 
ensure the inclusion of human factors in the mainstream signoff 
of space station design. Timely man/systems integration review 
will reduce costs, improve schedules, and ensure a better 
finished product for crew use. 
Workload 
Workload problems have been encountered in essentially all 
manned space programs since project Gemini. The working 
environment in space is much different from that on Earth, 
particularly during EVA activities, and the physical, metabolic, 
and psychological workload imposed by different types and 
duration of activity can pose serious problems. While underwater 
simulation of space tasks has proven to be a valuable predictive 
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technique for assessment of workload, much remains to be done. 
This is particularly true in the scheduling of multi-crew 
administrative, housekeeping, and management activities. 
Information Management 
With computer processing and new electronic displays, it is 
possible to present information in a number of different formats. 
This information also can be processed to varying levels of 
abstraction. The problem becomes one of presenting information 
so that it best supports the task demands of the crewmember and 
can be used by him easily and accurately. Research must be done 
to improve our understanding of how astronauts cognitively 
organize (e.g. encode) the tasks they must perform, and of how to 
display the needed information so that it is perceived in a 
manner congruent with that oq~anization (Montemerlo, 1982). As 
space systems become ever morE~ complex, problems concerning the 
management and utilization of information are becoming of 
paramount importance. 
Countermeasures 
There are a number of physiological changes which occur in 
astronauts in both short- and long-duration space missions. Some 
of these adaptations, such as hematology changes, appear to be 
self-limiting; others, such as loss of bone mineral, appear to be 
progressive. Numerous countermeasures have been developed and 
tested for moderating these physiological changes. However, the 
countermeasures themselves may operate to impair the 
effectiveness of astronaut performance. For instance, in recent 
years the Soviet space program has used a relatively standard 
program which involves three exercise periods of 2.5 hours per 
day for 3 days, with some optional schedule change on the fourth 
day. While this appears to be effective, it is very time 
consuming. What is the best procedure for use of the physical 
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conditioning procedures, as well as the nutritional and 
pharmacological countermeasures, so as to least impact the 
activities conducted during long-term residence in a space 
station? 
Artificial Gravity 
Much thought has been given to the need for use of 
artificial gravity during space missions to alleviate 
physiological changes noted in major body systems. While less 
attention has been given to it, there remains a question of a 
possible need for use of artificial gravity to sustain the 
performance effectiveness of work crews during long space 
missions. Can the full class of space activities to be required 
on a space station and during the construction of large 
structures in space be accomplished as desired through the use of 
appropriate restraint systems or will some form of artificial 
gravity be necessary? 
Human Sensory Extension Systems/Telepresence 
Telepresence is a promising technique in which a remote 
operator (robot) performs normal human functions guided by 
sensory feedback to the human controller. A key advantage is 
that telepresence allows the human operator to perform dangerous 
EVA activities while remaining within the safety of the space 
station. It also is economically advantageous since there is no 
requirement to protect the robotic operator from such hazards as 
radiation or decompression. However, telepresencecan only 
achieve its real potential if the required sensory feedback is 
provided to the operator within the space station. At present, 
this cannot be accomplished. Much research is required for the 
development of appropriate and efficient systems for visual and 
tactile sensing at the work site and for presenting this 
information to the human operator. 
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Training 
Ensuring adequate crew training and on-orbit skill retention 
during long missions will become more important with increased 
mission complexity and length. A crewmember will require overall 
training which must be generaU.zed to numerous vehicle areas. 
On-oribt provisions must include refresher materials to keep 
skills at specified proficiency levels. Work must continue on 
techniques to identify the dimensions of required training, to 
develop training systems for use in a spacecraft, and to devise 
measurement procedures with whi.ch to evaluate training 
effectiveness. 
Life Sciences Program 
The NASA Life Sciences Division either has or will be 
initiating in FY 1985 studies in each of the above areas of 
concern in support of future aetivities in space. 
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Appendix A 
The Soviet Salyut 6-7 Experience 
The Soviet space station program began in April 1971 with 
the launch of Salyut 1, an orbiting laboratory, which soon was 
inhabited by a crew of three cosmonauts for a period of 23 days. 
Although Salyut 1 was intentionally de-orbited after 175 days, a 
number of scientific activities were completed ranging from 
astronomical and Earth photography to experiments on the effects 
of weightlessness on plant growth and nutrition. 
The launch of Salyut 6 in 1977 inaugurated the second 
generation of Soviet space stations having greatly increased 
emphasis on "livability" and features to enhance cosmonaut 
performance. Improved food service and hygiene systems, as well 
as the inclusion of entertainment items, served to overcome 
problems noted with earlier Salyut vehicles. This improvement 
theme continued with Salyut 7, launched in 1982 and operational 
at this time. In both of these programs, manned missions of 
record length were completed and the practice of "visiting crews" 
was begun. As a result, a considerable body of information has 
been compiled concerning man's capability to work productively in 
a long-duration space setting. 
The work schedule for a Salyut cosmonaut has been heavy and 
maintained during the full course of the extended missions. 
Cosmonaut Valentine Lebedev, who completed a record 211-day 
mission in 1982, commented both on the level of activity and the 
psychological state when he noted in his diary, "while the work 
is intense, it is healthy. Even if the work is difficult and one 
gets tired, you have mental satisfaction." 
The extent of cosmonaut work requirements is reflected in 
the accomplishments of the Salyut 6 program. In the course of 
the four main missions, there was a total of 27 dockings of 
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spacecraft with the space station, 4 redockings from one part of 
the station to another, 15 landings of Soyuz and Soyuz T (crew 
delivery) craft, as well as 12 descents of the Progress (unmanned 
supply) craft. One Salyut 6 crew performed 55 experiments 
dealing with materials technology as well as about 50 biomedical 
experiments (Myasnikov, 1983). The work pace did take its toll, 
however, and it was necessary to reduce the working day from 16 
to 12 hours during the course of the 211-day mission. The 
establishment of optimum work schedules remains an issue in 
planning for long missions. 
Maintenance and Repair 
The capability of space crewmen to accomplish both scheduled 
and unscheduled maintenance and repair work has proven 
invaluable. For example, the Salyut 6 spacecraft has a design 
life of 18 months (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983). 
Largely as a result of cosmonauts routinely working as in-orbit 
repairmen, the spacecraft continued its mission for almost 5 
years. 
Unplanned crew repairs were instrumental recently in saving 
the Salyut 7 program. A solar array problem reduced electrical 
power and seriously affected the vehicle's environmental control 
system (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1983). Without 
repair the Salyut 7 would have been unusable for later missions 
because of internal system damage resulting from excessive 
dampness. A specially trained repair crew was unable to reach 
the Salyut 7 because of a fire during the launch sequence which 
caused the mission to be aborted. As a result, the onboard 
cosmonauts, who had not been trained for station repair 
operations of this kind, completed the repairs successfully by 
following detailed instructions from ground controllers. Their 
mission then was completed on schedule. 
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Scientific Observations 
The combination of direct observation of Earth by crewmen 
and the use of advanced photographic techniques provided 
information of considerable value during the Salyut program. 
Lebedev, in his diary, makes frequent mention of the time spent 
in Earth observation. During Salyut 6, some 13,000 photographs 
were obtained using topographical and multispectral cameras. As 
a result, a supply of fresh water was located in a Russian desert 
and large-scale geological pictures coinciding with mineral 
deposits and oil regions were identified (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1983). It was judged that in 10 minutes, observa-
tions equivalent to several years of aerial photography could be 
achieved. 
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Appendix B 
The Spacelab-1 Exercise 
The European Space Agency Spacelab-1 was carried into orbit 
in the cargo bay of the Space Shuttle in November 1983 and 
represents a major advance in the use of space for scientific 
purposes. The Spacelab module can be outfitted with several tons 
of laboratory instruments for studies in astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, biology, medicine, and engineering. While future 
missions may be dedicated to,a single discipline, the mission of 
Spacelab-1 was to demonstrate the broad versatility of the space 
laboratory. It was also designed to test and verify the Spacelab 
hardware, flight and ground systems, and crew to demonstrate 
capabilities for an advanced space research program. In the 
course of verifying Spacelab systems, a wealth of scientific data 
were obtained. Significant advances were made in many 
disciplines. Of the 38 primary investigations carried on 
Spacelab-1, only 3 had a real loss of scientific information due 
to hardware failures. 
One of the successes of the Spacelab-1 mission was its 
demonstration of the efficiency achieved by complementary space 
and ground science crews working together. The synergistic 
relationship between the four Spacelab scientists and the larger 
ground crew working at the Payload Operations Control Center at 
the Johnson Space Center allowed continuing adjustment of 
experiment protocols and resulted in a better scientific return 
in many instances. The interchange between onboard scientists 
and ground-based investigators produced a greater volume of radio 
traffic than that between the astronauts in command of the 
Shuttle and their own Operations Control Center in Houston. 
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Maintenance and Repair 
As with the U.S. Skylab program and the Soviet Salyut 6/7 
missions, the Spacelab crew again proved the value of having 
astronauts onboard to diagnose and repair malfunctions in 
important items of hardware. The ability of the crew to repair 
major scientific instruments v1as a key aspect of the mission. 
The onboard scientists made at: least four major repairs which 
resulted in saving experiments. 
One of the most important of the Spacelab instruments, the 
German metric camera, suffered a malfunction which, without 
astronaut intervention, would have caused the loss of almost all 
of the scientific data it was designed to produce. The film 
transport in the camera jammed at the beginning of operation of 
the second film magazine. After 25 exposures of a 400-frame 
black and white film cassette, the advanced mechanism jammed. 
Through discussions between the Spacelab crew, the Payload 
Operations Control Center, thj~ Johnson Space Center, and the 
Zeiss Camera Company in Germany, a set of repair procedures was 
devised. Repairs were successful and complete photography was 
achieved over numerous locations in Western Europe, Africa, South 
America, and the United States. 
In another instance, the high data rate recorder failed on 
the fifth day of the mission and jeopardized data retrieval when 
the Space Shuttle was out of range of the Tracking and Data Relay 
Satellite. When the Mission Specialist opened the recorder he 
found that three of the rollers were stuck. By rocking them back 
and forth he was able to free them and thus bring this system 
back on-line. Again, the scientific objectives of Spacelab were 
achieved through an on-site r1epair capability. 
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Piloting Control 
The scientific objectives of the Spacelab mission required 
that the Space Shuttle be placed in a number of different 
orientations during orbital flight. The preflight maneuvering 
schedule called for 182 attitude changes. During the course of" 
the mission, 90 additional changes were requested in order to 
maximize the scientific return. The piloting capabilities of the 
two Space Shuttle astronauts were of great value in managing and 
accomplishing a rapidly changing maneuvering profile. 
Habitability 
The Spacelab is well engineered for stowage and access to 
crew material, location of scientific equipment, and layout of 
work stations. The design was developed with consideration both 
for ground training and flight operations. Crews have commented 
positively on its architectural qualities. However, such modules 
can only support two to three crewmembers on any given work shift 
without significant crowding. Larger crews will require a new 
layout of work stations and more habitable space. Even with 
smaller crews, the design of controls and placement of critical 
operational systems needs additional study. For example, a 
switch controlling the power to an experiment in Spacelab was 
inadvertently disabled during the mission. A careful systems 
engineering study will be needed to insure optimum habitability 
as well as safe operation in the forthcoming Space Station. 
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Appendix C 
The Space Shuttle Hission STS 41B Experience 
Two achievements of Space Shuttle Mission STS 41B were 
historical. For the first time. an orbiter landing was made at 
the Kennedy Space Center rathE!r than at Edwards AFB or Whi te 
Sands. New Mexico. Also for the first time. an astronaut flew 
untethered away from the spacE!craft. While both of these 
achievements represent significant advances in the Space Shuttle 
program. the second is of paramount importance in determining the 
way in which future missions ~iill be conducted. Astronauts now 
are free to leave the Shuttle to inspect it if any damage is 
suspected. to visit and repair other satellites in close orbit. 
and to conduct rescue mission8 should such ever be necessary. 
Also, when the Space Station becomes operational, space workers 
will be able to perform useful labors on external surfaces of the 
station and to participate in the construction of other space 
structures. The ability of astronauts to move freely and 
independently in space greatly increases their utility and value 
in the conduct of space missions. This was made possible through 
the development of new protocols for pre-breathing and nitrogen 
washout and through the establishment of optimum cabin/EVA suit 
pressure profiles. 
The first use of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) for 
untethered flight successfully met all objectives, with the 
exception of certain tests which could not be performed due to 
problems with other Shuttle components. Two extravehicular 
activity periods totaling 12 hours were completed with the MMU 
system. Free flight was made to a distance of over 300 feet from 
the Shuttle. Handling qualities were checked and the docking 
capability assessed. Repair procedures to be used on disabled 
satellites were practiced and, in a fortuitous sequence of 
events, a lost Shuttle item w,as retrieved before it could float 
away into space. 
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Manipulative Activities 
One astronaut using the MMU worked with a mockup of the 
Solar Max Satellite main electronics box which was mounted on a 
cargo bay pallet. One of the repair tasks, to be completed on 
the actual satellite in the next Space Shuttle mission, involved 
opening and disassembling the electronics box. This task was 
accomplished as planned, even though the space suit gloves 
imposed some restriction on finger and wrist movement. Then, in 
an actual repair task, the astronaut fixed a switch that had 
limited the scan capability of a mass spectrometer sensor head 
located also on the cargo bay pallet. These activities 
demonstrated a real capability of astronauts to perform repairs 
outside a spacecraft, even those in which small tools are used 
and in which delicate manipulative actions are required. This 
capability can be used to excellent purpose in the assembly and 
utilization of the Space Station. 
Work Procedures 
In some instances, work can be performed better in space 
than under one-gravity conditions. For example, during the 
simulated Solar Max repairs, the astronaut was seen to be hanging 
level from the manipulator arm over the payload bay and reaching 
down in a manner which would have been impossible in a gravity 
field. This ability to position himself as needed without fear 
of falling was an aid in the work performance. 
In some instances, work in space can be more difficult than 
predicted on the basis of preflight practice. One task done 
easily in the neutral buoyancy water tank trials proved to be 
quite difficult in space. This task consisted of hanging onto a 
ledge with one hand while maneuvering the manipulator foot 
restraint platform with the other. The difference was attributed 
to the viscous effect of the water. In any event, it was 
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concluded by the astronaut that a better means of restraining 
crewmen during EVA repair labors is definitely needed. Here is 
an instance where the full value of the human capability to 
perform external repairs is degraded through other features of 
the work scene. 
Workload 
The 41B Mission called attention once again to the problem 
of workload assessment and the timeline scheduling of crew 
activities. The Mission Commander noted that, during a period 
when two crewmembers were in EVA, five crewrnembers could have 
been used efficiently within the orbiter, as opposed to the four 
crewrnembers actually available. He stressed that it was 
important not to have the timelines of the two crewmen in EVA 
interlinked too closely. They should be timelined independently, 
so that one would not be delayed by the activities of the other. 
His comments reflect a need for continuing improvement in 
techniques for timeline scheduling of astronaut activities. 
An ongoing problem is that of excessive workload, in this 
case during EVA. It was quite difficult for a crewmember to use 
the foot restraint system properly. It was necessary to kick 
one's feet into the restraints and then to react to the torque 
produced on the wrists. Every time the astronaut crossed the 
payload bay and arrived at a new work position, he encountered 
the foot restraint problem. As a result of dealing with the 
torque, his arms were exhausted by this exercise. At the end of 
the first EVA period, the astronaut commented that, as a result 
of the complete fatigue, it would be very difficult to do EVA 
missions on consecutive days. Research is needed to develop 
techniques for predicting and controlling the build-up of 
excessive fatigue during what should be routine space tasks. 
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